Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: Two extensions of the Shapley value
Sylvain Béal (),
André Casajus (),
Eric Rémila () and
Philippe Solal ()
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André Casajus: HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Dr. Hops Craft Beer Bar, Leipzig, Germany
Eric Rémila: Université de Saint-Etienne, CNRS UMR 5824 GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, France
Philippe Solal: Université de Saint-Etienne, CNRS UMR 5824 GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, France
No 2019-03, Working Papers from CRESE
We relax the assumption that the grand coalition must form by imposing the axiom of Cohesive efficiency: the total payoffs that the players can share is equal to the maximal total worth generated by a coalition structure. We determine how the three main axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value are affected when the classical axiom of Efficiency is replaced by Cohesive efficiency. We introduce and characterize two variants of the Shapley value that are compatible with Cohesive efficiency. We show that our approach is not limited to variants of the Shapley value.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crb:wpaper:2019-03
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