EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The optimal payment system for hospitals under adverse selection, moral hazard, and limited liability

François Maréchal () and Lionel Thomas ()
Additional contact information
François Maréchal: Université de Bourgogne Franche-Comté, CRESE
Lionel Thomas: Université de Bourgogne Franche-Comté, CRESE

No 2019-04, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: This paper studies the optimal contract offered by a regulator to a partially altruistic hospital under adverse selection, moral hazard, and limited liability. We consider that the hospital privately observes the severity of illness of patients and chooses a hidden quality that influences the probability of some complications or comorbidities (CCs) occurring. We analyze the conditions under which the payment, for a given diagnosis Related Group, should be refined according to the severity of illness and the occurrence of CCs.

Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2019-04.pdf First version, 2019 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crb:wpaper:2019-04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from CRESE Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Yves Oytana ().

 
Page updated 2021-04-15
Handle: RePEc:crb:wpaper:2019-04