Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies

Sylvain Béal and Florian Navarro

No 2020-01, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: This note introduces three variant of existing axioms in which equal players are replaced by necessary players, i.e. players such that each coalition not containing such a player enjoys a zero worth. As an example, we weaken the axiom of equal treatment of equals by requiring that two necessary players obtain the same payoff. We highlight that necessary players can replace equal players in many well-known axiomatic characterizations, but not in all. In addition, we provide new characterizations of the Shapley value, the class of positively weighted Shapley values, the Solidarity value and the Equal Division value. This sheds a new light on the real role of equal treatment of equals in the axiomatic literature.

Keywords: Necessary players; equal players; mutually dependent players; equal treatment of necessary players; (weighted-)Shapley value; Equal Division value; Solidarity value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies (2020)
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