Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error

Murat Mungan (mmungan@gmu.edu), Marie Obidzinski and Yves Oytana
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Murat Mungan: Antonin Scalia Law School George Mason University

No 2020-09, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: We study how legal procedures may evolve over time in response to technological advancements which increase the accuracy of evidence collection methods. First, we show that accuracy and type-1 errors (wrongful findings of liability) must reduce each other's effectiveness in mitigating optimal type-2 errors (wrongful failures to assign liability) for previous results in the literature to hold. When this condition holds, for major crimes the median voter's tolerance for type-1 errors is reduced as the legal system's accuracy increases. However, this relationship need not hold for minor offenses. Our analysis also reveals that legal processes that emerge under electoral pressures convict more often than is optimal but less often than necessary to maximize deterrence. Moreover, when the median voter's preferences are implemented, an increase in accuracy can counter-intuitively reduce welfare.

JEL-codes: K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2020-09.pdf First version, 2020 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error (2023)
Working Paper: Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error (2023)
Working Paper: Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error (2023)
Working Paper: Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crb:wpaper:2020-09

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