A characterization of the family of Weighted priority values
Sylvain Béal,
Sylvain Ferrières (),
Adriana Navarro-Ramos () and
Philippe Solal
Additional contact information
Sylvain Ferrières: Université de Saint-Etienne, CNRS UMR 5824 GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, France
Adriana Navarro-Ramos: Université de Saint-Etienne, CNRS UMR 5824 GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, France
No 2022-03, Working Papers from CRESE
Abstract:
We introduce a new family of values for TU-games with a priority structure. This family both contains the Priority value recently introduced by Béal et al. (2021) and the Weighted Shapley values (Kalai and Samet, 1987). Each value of this family is called a Weighted priority value and is constructed as follows. A strictly positive weight is associated with each agent and the agents are partially ordered according to a binary relation. An agent is a priority agent with respect to a coalition if it is maximal in this coalition with respect to the partial order. A Weighted priority value distributes the dividend of each coalition among the priority agents of this coalition in proportion to their weights. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the family of the Weighted Shapley values without the additivity axiom. To this end, we borrow the Priority agent out axiom from Béal et al. (2021), which is used to axiomatize the Priority value. We also reuse, in our domain, the principle of Super weak differential marginality introduced by Casajus (2018) to axiomatize the Positively weighted Shapley values (Shapley, 1953a). We add a new axiom of Independence of null agent position which indicates that the position of a null agent in the partial order does not affect the payoff of the other agents. Together with Efficiency, the above axioms characterize the Weighted Shapley values. Finally, we show that this axiomatic characterization holds on the subdomain where the partial order is structured by levels. This entails an alternative characterization of the Weighted Shapley values.
Keywords: Differential marginality; Priority value; Shapley value; Superweak differiential marginality; Weighted Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2022-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2022-03.pdf First version, 2022 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: A characterization of the family of Weighted priority values (2022) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crb:wpaper:2022-03
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from CRESE Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laurent Kondratuk ().