Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule

Mostapha Diss, Clinton Gubong Gassi () and Issofa Moyouwou ()
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Clinton Gubong Gassi: CRESE EA3190, Univ. Bourgogne Franche-Comté, F-25000 Besançon, France & Department of Mathematics - University of Yaounde I. BP 47 Yaounde, Cameroon
Issofa Moyouwou: Ecole Normale Supérieure - Department of Mathematics - University of Yaounde I. BP 47 Yaounde, Cameroon

No 2022-05, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: We study the relationships between two well-known social choice concepts, namely the principle of social acceptability introduced by Mahajne and Volij (2018), and the majoritarian compromise rule introduced by Sertel (1986) and studied in detail by Sertel and Yılmaz (1999). The two concepts have been introduced separately in the literature in the spirit of selecting an alternative that satisfies most individuals in single-winner elections. Our results in this paper show that the two concepts are so closely related that the interaction between them cannot be ignored. We show that the majoritarian compromise rule always selects a socially acceptable alternative when the number of alternatives is even and we provide a necessary and sufficient condition so that the majoritarian compromise rule always selects a socially acceptable alternative when the number of alternatives is odd. Moreover, we show that when we restrict ourselves to the three well-studied classes of single-peaked, single-caved, and single-crossing preferences, the majoritarian compromise rule always picks a socially acceptable alternative whatever the number of alternatives and the number of voters.

Keywords: Voting; Single-winner elections; Social acceptability; Majoritarian compromise rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2022-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dem and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule (2023)
Working Paper: Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule (2023)
Working Paper: Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule (2022)
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