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The French system of water services

Pierre Bauby

No 903, CIRIEC Working Papers from CIRIEC - Université de Liège

Abstract: France is the European country where water service delegated management to private companies is most developed. Here, about only 21% of the population in water supply and 47% in wastewater treatment are served by a public operator through a direct management (régie). This paper analyses the origins of the delegated management in France, its main features, and its reforms. Its also provides summary analyses of three case studies (Rouen, Grenoble and Nantes) based on the Euromarket project. The paper is structured in three parts: A. National Analysis of Water Service 1. Legal framework, responsibility and organisation for planning and programming 2. Provision and regulation of water services a) Origins of the delegation-concession of the water supply and sanitation sector to private companies in France b) The fundamental characteristics of the French delegation-concession system as applied to the water supply-water treatment sector c) Regulation issues and reform initiatives B. Case studies C. Summary of findings on major issues and trends in the provision of this service sector

Keywords: French water services; local services of general economic interest; direct management; delegated management; lease contracts; concession contracts; asymmetry of information; principal-agent theory; competition; corruption; transparency; regulation; users participation; water price; Véolia-Générale des Eaux; Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux; multi-service companies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crc:wpaper:0903

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