Samaritan Bundles: Clustering in NGO Projects

Gani Aldashev, Marco Marini and Thierry Verdier

No 1806, CIRIEC Working Papers from CIRIEC - Université de Liège

Abstract: We build a model with non-governmental organizations competing through fundraising for donations and choosing issues to focus their projects on. Donors have latent willingness-to-give that differs across issues, but need to be "awakened" to give. Raising funds focusing on the same issue creates positive spillovers across NGOs. Each NGO chooses whether to compete in the same market (clustering) with spillovers, or to face weaker competition under issue specialization. The resulting equilibrium configuration crucially depends on the donors’ baseline willingness-to-give and the cost of fundraising. We also develop variants of the model with donors’ asymmetric (issue-dependent) willingness-to-give, settings where NGOs can coordinate their fundraising activities and/or issue choices, the inter-temporal choices of NGOs, and illustrate the mechanisms of the model with several case studies.

Keywords: Non-governmental organizations; Fundraising; Foreign Aid; Clustering (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 F35 L13 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crc:wpaper:1806

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