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Gangs and Crime Deterrence

Abdalla Mansour (abmansour@yahoo.com), Nicolas Marceau and Steeve Mongrain

No 138, Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers from CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal

Abstract: A framework is developed in which the formation of gangs --- the criminal market structure --- is endogenous. We examine the impact of crime deterrence in this framework. It is shown that for a given gang structure, an increase in deterrence reduces criminal output. However, under identifiable circumstances, an increase in deterrence can also lead to an increase in the number of competing criminal gangs and to an increase in total illegal output.

Nous étudions un monde dans lequel la formation de gangs criminels est endogène, l'ensemble des gangs criminels constituant la structure de marché d'un bien illégal. Nous étudions l'impact de la dissuasion du crime dans un tel cadre. Pour une structure de marché donnée, accroître la dissuasion tend à réduire la production du bien illégal. Cependant, dans certains cas, accroître la dissuasion peut conduire a un accroissement du nombre de gangs criminels dans le marché et donc, à une plus grande concurrence. Il est alors possible que la production du bien illégal augmente.

Keywords: criminal gangs; formation; crime deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2001-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Journal Article: Gangs and Crime Deterrence (2006) Downloads
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