The Social Efficiency of Privately Enforced Property Rights

Pierre Lasserre

No 9305, Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM from Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques

Keywords: Droits de propriété; second rang; protection; décisions décentralisées; coûts de transaction; propriété commune; ressources naturelles. Property rights; second best; enforcement; decentralized decisions; transaction costs; common property; natural resources. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cre:uqamwp:9305

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