On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard

Gwenaël Piaser ()
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Gwenaël Piaser: Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg

LSF Research Working Paper Series from Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg

Abstract: In this note we show that the equilibrium characterized by Biais, Martimort and Rochet (Econometrica, 2000) could have been characterized by direct mechanisms even if the Revelation Principle does not apply in their setting. The use of more sophisticated mechanisms, such as menus, was not necessary.

Keywords: Common Agency; Revelation Principle; Direct Mechanisms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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