Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance: The Case of UK Pension Funds

Mara Faccio () and Meziane Lasfer

No 11, CeRP Working Papers from Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies, Turin (Italy)

Abstract: We analyze the monitoring role of occupational pension funds, the largest category of shareholders in the UK. Our hypothesis is that, unlike other financial institutions, occupational pension funds are expected to monitor companies in which they hold large stakes because of their objectives, structure and overall share holding. After controlling for size and industry, we find that the value added by these funds is negligible and their holdings do not lead companies to comply with the Code of Best Practice or outperform their industry counterparts despite their long-term holding strategies.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Pension funds; Board structure; Performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G32 G35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2001-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crp:wpaper:11

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