An Optimal Anti-Drug Law Enforcement Policy

Sylvaine Poret

No 2005-17, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Abstract: This paper presents a model of an optimal anti-drug law enforcement policy,whose objective is the reduction of drug-related social cost, including the net costof law enforcement, the social harm, and the surplus of agents. We consider avertically organized distribution system with two levels: traffickers and retailers.The two questions are which type of sellers authorities must pursue, traffickers orretailers, and which sanction a seller has to pay in case of arrest. The optimal levelof fine depends on the type of sellers arrested, the probability of arrest at the timeof a transaction, and the sensitivity of the harm to consumed quantities. We showthat the maximum fine is rarely optimal.

Pages: 28
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: An optimal anti-drug law enforcement policy (2009)
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