La corruption comme une imbrication de contrats: Une revue de la littérature microéconomique

Nicolas Jacquemet ()

No 2005-29, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Abstract: Regarding economic analysis, corruption is best understood as a situation in which twocontradictory contracts are at stake : a delegation contract, between a principal and anagent, and a corruption pact. This illegal agreement, concluded between this agent and abriber, is aimed at misusing the discretionary power delegated to the agent by the principal. Given this "contractual" definition of corruption, the survey provided here highlights howcorruption behavior results from the properties of each of the three bilateral relationshipsbetween those players.

Pages: 44
Date: 2005
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