The Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction with Final Discounts

Laurent Lamy

No 2007-25, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Abstract: We slightly modify the Ausubel-Milgrom [3] Proxy Auction byadding a final stage which possibly induces some discounts relativeto the final accepted bids of the 'original' auction. The proxy auctionwith final discounts is such that the outcome is a point in the bidderoptimal frontier of the Core. Then truthful reporting is an equilibriumif and only if the Vickrey outcome is in the Core, a condition that isnecessary but not sufficient in the original version of the proxy auctionas illustrated by an example.

Pages: 20
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://crest.science/RePEc/wpstorage/2007-25.pdf Crest working paper version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crs:wpaper:2007-25

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Murielle Jules Maintainer-Email : murielle.jules@ensae.Fr.