Contingent Auctions with Allocative Externalities: Vickrey Versus the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction

Laurent Lamy
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Laurent Lamy: Crest

No 2007-26, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Abstract: We introduce contingent auction mechanisms, which is a supersetof combinatorial auctions, and where bidders submit bids on packagesthat are contingent on the whole final assignment. Without externalities,the Vickrey and the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction areboth robust if items are perceived as substitutes. Such an equivalencebetween those formats may not hold with externalities and theanalog of the substitute condition is a complex unexplored issue. We analyse those issues in the Negative Group-Dependent Externalities framework, a general structure with allocative externalities betweenjoint-purchasers.

Pages: 42
Date: 2007
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