Fixed-Term Contracts, Incentives and Effort

Pauline Givord and Lionel Wilner

No 2009-15, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Abstract: This paper focuses on labor market transitions and especially on those involvingfixed-term contracts. Our contribution is twofold: first, we provide an accuratemeasure of labor market transitions; second, we analyze the potential incentive effectof fixed-term contracts on "effort". To deal with unobserved heterogeneity, we use adynamic multinomial logit with fixed effects. We construct an indicator of effort forfixed-term workers, which is basically "working more than siblings". Using Frenchdata, we find that a fixed-term contract provides significantly better perspectivesthan unemployment, but no evidence of any significant impact of exerting effort onthe probability of getting an open-ended contract.

Pages: 27
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: When Does the Stepping‐Stone Work? Fixed‐Term Contracts Versus Temporary Agency Work in Changing Economic Conditions (2015)
Working Paper: Short-term contracts: trap or stepping stone toward stable employment? (2009)
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