Neighbor Discrimination Theory and evidence from the French rental market
Pierre-Philippe Combes (),
Bruno Decreuse () and
Alain Trannoy ()
No 2016-36, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics
This paper describes a novel concept of customer discrimination in the housing market, neighbor discrimination. We build up a matching model with ethnic externalities where landlords differ in the number of apartments they own within the same building. Larger landlords discriminate more often only if some tenants are prejudiced against the minority group. Testing the null hypothesis whereby minority tenants are equally likely to have a large landlord provides a natural test for the existence of neighbor discrimination. In an empirical application, we show that this null hypothesis is rejected for African immigrants in the French private rental market. We then show that the local proportion of large landlords is positively correlated with African tenants’ probability of being con?ned to public housing projects, whereas this is not the case of other demographic groups.
Keywords: Customer Discrimination; Matching frictions; Neighborhood Externalities; Housing Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R21 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Neighbor discrimination theory and evidence from the French rental market (2018)
Working Paper: Neighbor discrimination theory and evidence from the French rental market (2018)
Working Paper: Neighbor Discrimination: Theory and evidence from the French rental market (2015)
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