Platform Price Parity Clauses with Direct Sales

Bjørn Olav Johansen () and Thibaud Vergé ()
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Thibaud Vergé: CREST; ENSAE; Université Paris-Saclay; Norwegian School of Economics

No 2017-45, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Abstract: We analyze the effects of price parity clauses in a setting where competing sellers distribute their products directly as well as through competing platforms. These clauses prevent a seller from offering its product at a lower price on other platforms or through its own direct sales channel. We show that when we account for the sellers? participation constraints, price parity clauses do not always lead to higher commissions and ?final prices. Instead, we fi?nd that they may simultaneously bene?fit all the actors (platforms, sellers and consumers), even in the absence of traditional efficiency arguments.

Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2017-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic, nep-mkt and nep-pay
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Working Paper: Platform price parity clauses with direct sales (2017)
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