Do Politicians Shape the Electorate ? Evidence from French Municipalities

Benoit Schmutz and Gregory Verdugo

No 2020-18, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Abstract: When public housing is managed at the local level, politicians might strategically influence admission policies to attract inhabitants more likely to vote for them. Using thirty years of municipal elections in France, we show that in cities where a left- instead of right-wing mayor has been elected, the share of immigrants in the population increases by 1p.p. within six years after the elections. Most of this increase reflects an increase in the share of non-European immigrants in municipal public housing. In cities initially endowed with more public housing, the effects are higher, more persistent, and associated with longer-lasting incumbent advantage.

Keywords: Immigration; Public Housing; Local Elections; Incumbency Advantage. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H4 H7 R38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 56 pages
Date: 2020-07-02, Revised 2021-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-mig, nep-pol and nep-ure
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