Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes

Margarita Kirneva () and Matias Nuñez
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Margarita Kirneva: CREST, CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique

No 2021-08, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Abstract: We design voting mechanisms in which every Nash equilibrium is coalition proof, preventing the well known coordination failures of usual voting systems. In each of these simultaneous mechanisms, each voter has the right to select a list of alternatives to veto, and the winner is selected randomly from the nonvetoed alternatives. For each specification of the veto rights, we show that each of these mechanisms implements a veto by random priority rule introduced by Moulin[1981]. We then discuss necessary conditions for arbitrary mechanisms to satisfy implementation in both Nash and coalition proof and show that the existence of veto rights in the mechanism is unavoidableto achieve this demanding implementation notion.

Keywords: Implementation; Voting; Vetoes; Coalition Formation; Efficiency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2021-06-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes (2021)
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