Strategic Delegation in Experimental Duopolies with Endogenous Incentive Contracts
Constantine Manasakis (),
Evangelos Mitrokostas () and
Emmanuel Petrakis ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Nikolaos Georgantzís ()
No 809, Working Papers from University of Crete, Department of Economics
Keywords: Experimental economics; Oligopoly theory; Managerial delegation; Endogenous contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crt:wpaper:0809
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