Do Firms' Owners Delegate both Short-Run and Long-Run Decisions to Their Managers in Equilibrium?

Evangelos Mitrokostas () and Emmanuel Petrakis

No 815, Working Papers from University of Crete, Department of Economics

Keywords: Strategic Delegation; Oligopoly; R&D Investments; Equilibrium Delegation Schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C20 C72 L22 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2008-06-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-mic
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