Endogenous Managerial Incentive Contracts in a Differentiated Duopoly, With and Without Commitment
Constantine Manasakis (),
Evangelos Mitrokostas () and
Emmanuel Petrakis ()
No 905, Working Papers from University of Crete, Department of Economics
Keywords: Oligopoly; Managerial delegation; Endogenous contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Endogenous managerial incentive contracts in a differentiated duopoly, with and without commitment (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crt:wpaper:0905
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