Economics at your fingertips  

Endogenous Managerial Incentive Contracts in a Differentiated Duopoly, With and Without Commitment

Constantine Manasakis (), Evangelos Mitrokostas () and Emmanuel Petrakis ()

No 905, Working Papers from University of Crete, Department of Economics

Keywords: Oligopoly; Managerial delegation; Endogenous contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2009-06-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed


Downloads: (external link) First version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous managerial incentive contracts in a differentiated duopoly, with and without commitment (2010) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Crete, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kostis Pigounakis ().

Page updated 2023-01-22
Handle: RePEc:crt:wpaper:0905