Downstream Cross-Holdings and Upstream Collusion

Konstantinos Charistos (), Ioannis Pinopoulos and Panagiotis Skartados ()

No 2303, Working Papers from University of Crete, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine the effects of (passive) cross-holdings in the downstream market on the sustainability of upstream collusion. We consider two competing vertical chains with downstream Cournot and homogeneous goods. Each downstream firm holds a (symmetric) non-controlling share of its rival.

Keywords: competing vertical chains; cross-holdings; passive ownership; tacit collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L40 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2023-02-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crt:wpaper:2303

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