Electoral Competition and Public Spending on Education: Evidence from African Countries

David Stasavage

No 2001-17, CSAE Working Paper Series from Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford

Abstract: Electoral competition can have a significant influence on government decisions regarding public spending. In this paper I examine whether the move to multiparty elections in many African countries in the last ten years has been associated with a clear change in priorities for public spending on education. In particular, I argue that the need to obtain an electoral majority may have prompted governments to devote greater resources to primary schools. I test this hypothesis using panel data on electoral competition and education spending in thirty-five African countries over the period 1980-1999. The results strongly support the hypothesis and are robust to controls for both unobserved country effects and other determinants of spending.

Date: 2001
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