Risk Pooling, Risk preferences, and Social Networks

Orazio Attansio, Abigail Barr, Juan-Camilo Cardenas, Garance Genicot and Costas Mehgir

No 2009-20, CSAE Working Paper Series from Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford

Abstract: Using date from a field experiment conducted in seventy Colombian municipalities, we investigate who pools risk with whom when risk pooling arrangements are not formally enforced. We explore the roles played by risk attitudes and network connections both theoretically and empirically. We find that pairs of participants who share a bond of friendship or kinship are more likely to (1) join the same risk pooling group and to (2) group assortatively with respect to risk attitudes. Also, consistent with our theoretical finding that when there is a problem of trust the process of pooling assortativley with respect to risk preferences is perturbed, we find (3) only weak evidence of such assorting among unfamiliar individuals.

Keywords: Field experiment; risk sharing; social sanctions; Insurance; Group formation: matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D71 D81 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Risk Pooling, Risk Preferences, and Social Networks (2012)
Working Paper: Risk Pooling, Risk Preferences, and Social Networks (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csa:wpaper:2009-20

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