Fighting for votes: theory and evidence on the causes of electoral violence

Olivier Sterck

No 2015-19-2, CSAE Working Paper Series from Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford

Abstract: I develop a theory of pre-electoral violence in which parties resort to violent tactics if political competition is tight and violent supporters are numerous, and if polarization between violent supporters is high. The importance of these conditions varies with the type of violence (clashes, intimidation or murders). I test the model using data on the 2010 elections in Burundi. In line with the model, electoral violence before the election was more likely in municipalities characterized by both close political competition and high density of demobilized combatants. Violence was also more likely where polarization between demobilized combatants was high.

Keywords: Electoral violence; Polarization; Fractionalization; Political competition; Burundi (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H56 N4 O12 O17 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Fighting for Votes: Theory and Evidence on the Causes of Electoral Violence (2020)
Working Paper: Fighting for votes: theory and evidence on the causes of electoral violence (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csa:wpaper:2015-19-2

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