SHAREHOLDERS’ VOTING POWER AND BLOCK TRANSACTION PREMIA: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ITALIAN LISTED COMPANIES

Giovanna Nicodamo and Alessandro Sembenelli
Additional contact information
Giovanna Nicodamo: Università di Torino

CERIS Working Paper from CNR-IRCrES Research Institute on Sustainable Economic Growth - Torino (TO) ITALY - former Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth - Moncalieri (TO) ITALY

Abstract: According to our pricing framework block transaction premia depend on voting power being transferred through a block relative to voting power enjoyed by the market. Block transaction premia are shown to be correlated with both the block seller's and the block buyer's Shapley- Shubik power indexes in a sample of Italian companies. This is consistent with the notion, first presented by Zwiebel (1995), that private benefits deriving from control of a company are divisible, and that the share of private benefits accruing to each shareholder is proportional to the probability of being pivotal in a controlling coalition.

Keywords: Shapley values; control rents; ownership structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G12 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1996-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.byterfly.eu/islandora/object/librib:372163 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csc:cerisp:199617

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CERIS Working Paper from CNR-IRCrES Research Institute on Sustainable Economic Growth - Torino (TO) ITALY - former Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth - Moncalieri (TO) ITALY Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anna Perin () and Giancarlo Birello ().