Political Institutions and Distributive Politics in Japan: Getting Along with the Opposition
Yusaku Horiuchi ()
Asia Pacific Economic Papers from Australia-Japan Research Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University
This paper analyses distributive policy-making in Japan using a natural experimental situation from August 1993 to March 1995. During this period, the partisan makeup of the ruling coalition in the Lower House dramatically changed without dissolution of the House. By comparing FY1994 and FY1995 budgets compiled by two different coalition governments, we can control for incumbent-specific strength to influence pork-barreling and can focus on how each district’s representation in the ruling coalition affects the geographical allocation of public expenditures. The result shows the negative effect of the ruling coalition’s seat share on per capita transfers. We argue that this is a logically consistent consequence under incentive mechanisms produced by Japan’s political institutions. The ruling coalition had an incentive to buy the support or acquiescence of opposition members in order to assure smooth operation in the legislative process.
JEL-codes: Z19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Political Institutions and Distributive Politics in Japan: Getting Along with the Opposition (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csg:ajrcau:363
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Asia Pacific Economic Papers from Australia-Japan Research Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Akira Kinefuchi ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).