Adoption of an IMF Programme and Debt Rescheduling. An Empirical Analysis

Silvia Marchesi

No 152, Development Working Papers from Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano

Abstract: The existence of an empirical relationship between the adoption of an IMF programme and the concession of a debt rescheduling by commercial creditors is tested using a bivariate probit model. If countries who have arrangements with the IMF are more likely than others to obtain a rescheduling of their external debt we could conclude that the adoption of an IMF programme could work as a sort of signal of a country’s “good willingness”, which is thus rewarded with the debt relief. The results confirm the existence of a significant effect of the adoption of an IMF programme on the subsequent concession of a debt rescheduling by creditors.

Keywords: IMF Conditionality; Debt Rescheduling; Bivariate probit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C35 F34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling. An empirical analysis (2003)
Working Paper: Adoption of an IMF Programme and Debt Rescheduling. An Empirical Analysis (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csl:devewp:152

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