Asylum Seekers in Europe: The Warm Glow of a Hot Potato

Giovanni Facchini, Oliver Lorz and Gerald Willmann ()

No 205, Development Working Papers from Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano

Abstract: The Common European Asylum System calls for increased coordination of the EU countries’ policies towards asylum seekers and refugees. In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of the effects of coordination, explicitly modelling the democratic process through which policy is determined. In a symmetric, two-country citizen-candidate setup, in which accepting asylum seekers in one country generates a cross-border externality in the other, we show that coordination is desirable. Internalizing the externality leads to a welfare improvement over the non–cooperative outcome. However, contrary to suggestions by many observers, we show that allowing for cross-country transfers in the cooperative outcome leads to a welfare inferior outcome because the possibility of compensation exacerbates strategic delegation effects.

Keywords: Political Economy; Asylum Policy; Migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 H77 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-06-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Asylum seekers in Europe: the warm glow of a hot potato (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csl:devewp:205

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