Do Countries Free Ride on MFN?

Rodney Ludema and Anna Maria Mayda

No 254, Development Working Papers from Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano

Abstract: The Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clause has long been suspected of creating a free rider problem in multilateral trade negotiations. To address this issue, we model multilateral negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation. We show that an optimal mechanism induces only the largest exporters to participate in negotiations over any product, thus providing a rationalization for the Principal supplier rule. We also show that, through this channel, equilibrium tariffs vary according to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of export shares: higher concentration in a sector reduces free riding and thus causes a lower tariff. Estimation of our model using sector-level tariff data for the U.S. provides strong support for this relationship.

Pages: 48
Date: 2008-06-30
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Do countries free ride on MFN? (2009)
Working Paper: Do Countries Free Ride on MFN? (2008)
Working Paper: Do Countries Free Ride on MFN? (2005)
Working Paper: Do Countries Free Ride on MFN? (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csl:devewp:254

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