Extended RJV cooperation and social welfare

Gianluca Femminis and Gianmaria Martini

No itemq0852, DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi from Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE)

Abstract: A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of increasing collusion in the final market. In a Cournot model, an extended RJV is welfare enhancing only when the Antitrust Authority is strong, so that the increase in distortion is limited, and when the size of the technical improvement is large, so that the introduction of the innovation is more valuable.

Keywords: RJV; R&D; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L41 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: nn pages
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino and nep-mic
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