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Patent licensing with Bertrand competitors

Stefano Colombo () and Luigi Filippini ()

No itemq1262, DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi from Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE)

Abstract: We study optimal licensing contracts in a differentiated Bertrand duopoly, and show that per-unit contracts are preferred to ad valorem contracts by the patentee, while welfare is higher under the ad valorem contract. The difference between Cournot and Bertrand case is explained in terms of quantity effect and profits effect.

Keywords: Two-part contracts; patent licensing, ad valorem royalties; Bertrand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2012-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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Related works:
Journal Article: Patent Licensing with Bertrand Competitors (2015) Downloads
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