Information disclosure in optimal auctions

Juan-José Ganuza and José Penalva

IC3JM - Estudios = Working Papers from Instituto Mixto Carlos III - Juan March de Ciencias Sociales (IC3JM)

Abstract: A celebrated result in auction theory is that the optimal reserve price in the standard private value setting does not depend on the number of bidders. We modify the framework by considering that the seller controls the accuracy with which bidders learn their valuations, and show that in such a case, the greater the number of bidders the more restrictive the reserve price. We also show that the auctioneer provides more information when using an optimal auction mechanism than when the object is always sold.

Keywords: Auctions; Private; values; Information; disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:imrepe:id-14-02

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