Collusion via signaling in open ascending auctions with multiple objects and complementarities

Sandro Brusco and Giuseppe Lopomo

DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa

Abstract: Collusive equilibria exist in open ascending auctions with multiple objects, if the number of bidders is sufficiently small relative to the number of objects, even with large complementarities in the buyers' utility functions. The bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Hence the complementarities are not realized.

Keywords: Auctions; Multiple; objects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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