Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
Matteo Triossi () and
Antonio Romero Medina ()
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
We study a class of sequential non-revelation mechanisms through which hospitals make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to doctors. The inclusion of contracts shrinks the set of equilibrium outcomes and harms doctors more than hospitals, but it maintains the stability of the set of equilibrium outcomes. Our analysis reveals the existence of a first-mover advantage that is absent from the model without contracts. The mechanisms of this class are outcome equivalent and implement the set of stable allocations in subgame perfect equilibrium when enough competitive pressure is present. Equilibrium outcomes form a lattice when preferences are substitutable.
Keywords: ultimatum; games; contracts; Many-to-many (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:24368
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