Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets

Matteo Triossi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We study a class of sequential non-revelation mechanisms through which hospitals make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to doctors. The inclusion of contracts shrinks the set of equilibrium outcomes and harms doctors more than hospitals, but it maintains the stability of the set of equilibrium outcomes. Our analysis reveals the existence of a first-mover advantage that is absent from the model without contracts. The mechanisms of this class are outcome equivalent and implement the set of stable allocations in subgame perfect equilibrium when enough competitive pressure is present. Equilibrium outcomes form a lattice when preferences are substitutable.

Keywords: Many-to-many; contracts; ultimatum; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-01-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (2023)
Working Paper: Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:24368

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