Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note
Antonio Romero-Medina and
Matteo Triossi ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina ()
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
In this note we prove that group strategy-proofness and strategyproofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in prioritybased resource allocation problems with multi-unit demand.
Keywords: Matching; Multi-unit; demand; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Group; Strategy; proofness; Essential; homogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 D78 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:25310
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().