Environmental consciousness and moral hazard international agreements to protect the environment

Anastasios Xepapadeas
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Emmanuel Petrakis

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: A group of countries that can potentially commit to cooperation to protect the environment are identified as environmentally-conscious countries. Conditions are examined under which they can provide self-financing side payments, to a second group of less environmentally-conscious countries, so that the two groups form a global or partial stable coalition that agrees to emit at the first-best global welfare optimum. A mechanism is also developed which must be incorporated into the agreement between the two groups, in order to induce all countries to emit at the desired level, even when global pollution has nonpoint source pollution characteristics.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; Moral; Hazard; in; Teams (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams ... 13bc3c229404/content (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:2895

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().