Extended paretian rules and relative utilitarianism

Amrita Dhillon ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: This paper introduces the 'Extended Pareto' axiom on Social welfare functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range of preferences) implied by the von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. With the addition of two other axioms: Anonymity and Weak IIA* it is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function called Relative Utilitarianism that consists of normalizing individual utilities between zero and one and then adding them.

Keywords: Group; Preferences; Multi-profile (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-07
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Working Paper: Extended Paretian Rules and Relative Utilitarianism (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:3912

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