Asymetric price-benefit auctions

Maria-Angeles de Frutos

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: This paper studies the performance of three different auction procedures for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership when the partners have valuations for the assets that are independent but asymmetrically distributed, wirh one partner reputed to be more interested in the assets to be divided. 1 provide results on existence, and uniqueness of the equilibrium induced by these auctions. 1 also show sorne propertiers of these equilibria, in particular tilat witil positive probability tile ex post outcome is inefficient. The results contrast wiril tilose for tile case of symmetric distributions.

Keywords: Efficient; dissolution; Auction; Asymmetry; Bayesian; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-11
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Journal Article: Asymmetric Price-Benefits Auctions (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:4141

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