Endogenous wage-bargaining institutions in oligopolistic industries

Minas Vlassis ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Emmanuel Petrakis

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: This paper develops a framework of endogenous formation of wage-bargaining institutions regarding the level at which unions and firms negotiate in industries with market power. We show that economic factors, such as asymmetries in productive efficiency and bargaining power, are responsible for the en~ ',gence of various degrees of bargaining centralization. An all unionefficient firms majorit) coalition typically establishes an extra stage of wage negotiations at the sectorial level. If, for given bargaining powers, the productivity differences are sufficiently high, wage negotiations are also conducted at firm-level. Otherwise, the (minimum) wage bargain struck at the sectorial level is simply confirmed by both, firms and unions. This is a case of complete bargaining centralization. If, however, technological and bargaining power asymmetries cancel out, wage negotiations are conducted only at the firm level (decentralized bargaining).

Keywords: Bargaining; institutions; Oligopoly; Minimum; wage; Majority; coalition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:6014

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