On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions

Maria-Angeles de Frutos and Robert Rosenthal

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: Equilibria are constructed for classes of game models of sequenced second-price auctions having identical common-valued objects In some of these the equilibrium price falls on average, and in others the seller loses on average by committing to announce publicly something that he knows. Both of these possibilities are surprises.

Keywords: Auctions; Common; valued; objects; Information; revelation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-Value Auctions (1998)
Working Paper: On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-value Auctions (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:6023

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