Credible equilibria in non-finite games and in games without perfect recall

Paula Corcho
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: José Luis Ferreira

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: Credible equilibria were defined in Ferreira, Gilboa and Maschler (1995) to handle situations of preferences changing along time in a model given by an extensive form game. This paper extends the definition to the case of infinite games and, more important, to games with nonperfect recall. These games are of great interest in possible applications of the model, but the original definition was not applicable to them. The difficulties of this extension are solved by using some ideas in the literatue of abstract systems and by proposing new ones that may prove useful in more general settings.

Keywords: semistable; partitions; stable; sets; ugly; sets; Bad; sets; credible; equilibrium; good; sets; infinite; games; imperfect; recall (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-05
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Journal Article: Credible equilibria in non-finite games and ingames without perfect recall (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:6025

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