"Sex-equal" Stable matching

Antonio Romero-Medina
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: This paper presents a solution concept that minimizes envy between groups 111 a bilateral matching market. This concept is designed to select stable matchings that are not men or women optimal. The idea is to compute the total number of women preferred by the men to their woman mates and the total number of men preferred by women to their mates in that matching. The absolute value of the distance between these two numbers generates the stable matchings with less envy between groups. An algorithm is provided to compute them.

Keywords: Matching; markets; Fair; distribution; No-envy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams ... d198e5a2c3ab/content (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: `Sex-Equal' Stable Matchings (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:6075

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().