Player splitting in estensive forms games

Andrés Perea, Mathijis Jansen and Dries Vermeulen

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: By a player splitting we mean a mechanism that distributes the information sets of a player among so-called agents. A player splitting is called independent if each path in the game tree contains at most one agent of every player. Following Mertens (1989), a solution is said to have the player splitting property if, roughly speaking, the solution of an extensive form game does not change by applying independent player splittings. We show that Nash equilibria, perfect equilibria, Kohlberg-Mertens stable sets and Mertens stable sets have the player splitting property. An example is given to show that the proper equilibrium concepts does not satisfy the player splitting property. Next, we give a definition of invariance under (general) player splittings which is an extension of the player splitting property to the situation where we also allow for dependent player splittings. We come to the conclusion that none of the solutions above are invariant under any dependent player splitting. The results are used to give several characterizations of the class of independent player splittings and the class of single appearance structures by means of invariance of solution concepts under player splittings.

Keywords: Invariance; Extensive; form; games; Player; spliting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams ... 1a02564ab6d9/content (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Player splitting in extensive form games (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:6150

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().