Information advantage in cournot oligopoly

Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Diego Moreno ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We model an oligopolistic industry where a number of firms that are asymmetrically informed about the environment compete via quantities, and we study how the information available to a firm affects its equilibrium profits. Indeed we find that if all firms have access to the same constant returns to scale technology, in any Bayesian equilibrium the information advantage of a firm is rewarded.

Keywords: Cournot; oligopoly; Information; advantage; Bayesian; equilibrium; correlated; equilibrium; Asymmetric; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams ... 432d5851c76a/content (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:6168

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().