Supporting others and the evolution of influence

Salvador Barberà () and Andrés Perea

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: In this paper we study environments in which agents can transfer influence to others by supporting them. When planning whom to support, they should take into account the future effect of this, since the receiving agent might use this influence to support others in the future. We show that in the presence of a finite horizon there is an essentially unique optimal support behavior which can be characterized in terms of associated value functions. The analysis of these value functions allows us to derive qualitative properties of optimal support strategies under different specific environments and to explicitly compute the optimal support behavior in some numerical examples. We also investigate the case of an infinite horizon. Examples show that multiple equilibria may appear in this setting, some of wich sustaining a degree of cooperation that would not be possible under a finite horizon.

Keywords: Dynamic; games; Value; functions; Continuum; player; set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams ... 882a4d0d6b33/content (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Supporting others and the evolution of influence (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:6171

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().