Interim efficient allocation mechanisms

Mikel Pérez-Nievas

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: In this paper, I characterize the set of interim incentive efficient allocation mechanisms for a broad class of problems with private information, which includes those associated with the provision of public goods (with or without exclusion) as well as the allocation of one or more units of a private good.

Keywords: Incomplete; information; Interim; efficiency; Pooling; of; types (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:7220

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